DOUBLE SPEND RACES

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Abstract. We correct the double spend race analysis given in Nakamoto's foundational Bitcoin article and give a closed-form formula for the probability of success of a double spend attack using the Regularized Incomplete Beta Function. We give the first proof of the exponential decay on the number of confirmations and find an asymptotic formula. Larger number of confirmations are necessary compared to those given by Nakamoto.

To the memory of our beloved teacher André Warusfel who taught us how to have fun with the applications of mathematics.

1. Introduction.

The main breakthrough in [7] is the solution to the *double spend problem* of an electronic currency unit without a central authority. Bitcoin is the first form of *peer-to-peer* (P2P) electronic currency.

A double spend attack can only be attempted with a substantial fraction of the hashrate used in the *Proof-of-Work* of the Bitcoin network. The attackers will start a *double spend race* against the rest of the network to replace the last blocks of the blockchain. The last section of [7] computes the probability that the attackers catch up. However Nakamoto's analysis is not accurate. We present a correct analysis and give a closed-form formula for this probability.

Theorem 1. *Let $0 < q < 1/2$, resp. $p = 1 - q$, the relative hash power of the group of the attackers, resp. of honest miners. After z blocks have been validated by the honest miners, the probability of success of the attackers is*

$$P(z) = I_{4pq}(z, 1/2) \ ,$$

where $I_x(a,b)$ is the Regularized Incomplete Beta Function

$$I_x(a,b) = \frac{\Gamma(a+b)}{\Gamma(a)\Gamma(b)} \int_0^x t^{a-1}(1-t)^{b-1}\, dt \ .$$

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2. Mathematics of mining.

We review some basic results in probability ([3] vol.2, p.8 for background). The process of bitcoin mining consists of computing block header hashes changing a nonce [1] in order to find a hash below a predefined threshold, the *difficulty* [7]. At each new hash the work is started from scratch, therefore the random variable $\boldsymbol{T}$ measuring the time it takes to mine a block is memoryless, which means that for any $t_1, t_2 > 0$

$$\mathbb{P}[\boldsymbol{T} > t_1 + t_2 | T > t_2] = \mathbb{P}[\boldsymbol{T} > t_1] \ .$$

Therefore we have

$$\mathbb{P}[\boldsymbol{T} > t_1 + t_2] = \mathbb{P}[\boldsymbol{T} > t_1 + t_2 | T > t_2].\mathbb{P}[\boldsymbol{T} > t_2] = \mathbb{P}[\boldsymbol{T} > t_1].\mathbb{P}[\boldsymbol{T} > t_2] \ .$$

This equation and a continuity argument determines the exponential function and implies that $\boldsymbol{T}$ is an exponentially distributed random variable:

$$f_{\boldsymbol{T}}(t) = \alpha e^{-\alpha t}$$

for some parameter $\alpha > 0$, the mining speed, with $t_0 = 1/\alpha = \mathbb{E}[\boldsymbol{T}]$.

If $(\boldsymbol{T}_1, \ldots, \boldsymbol{T}_n)$ is a sequence of independent identically distributed exponential random variables (for example $\boldsymbol{T}_k$ is the mining time of the k-th block), then the sum

$$\boldsymbol{S}_n = \boldsymbol{T}_1 + \ldots + \boldsymbol{T}_n$$

is a random variable following a gamma density with parameters (n, α) (obtained by convolution of the exponential density):

$$f_{\boldsymbol{S}_n}(t) = \frac{\alpha^n}{(n-1)!} t^{n-1} e^{-\alpha t} \ ,$$

and cumulative distribution

$$F_{\boldsymbol{S}_n}(t) = \int_0^t f_{\boldsymbol{S}_n}(u) du = 1 - e^{-\alpha t} \sum_{k=0}^{n-1} \frac{(\alpha t)^k}{k!} \ .$$

We define the random process $\boldsymbol{N}(t)$ as the number of mined blocks at time t. Setting $S_0 = 0$, we have

$$\boldsymbol{N}(t) = \#\{k \geq 1; \boldsymbol{S}_k \leq t\} = \max\{n \geq 0; \boldsymbol{S}_n < t\} \ .$$

Since $\boldsymbol{N}(t) = n$ is equivalent to $\boldsymbol{S}_n \leq t$ and $\boldsymbol{S}_{n+1} > t$ we get

$$\mathbb{P}[\boldsymbol{N}(t) = n] = F_{\boldsymbol{S}_n}(t) - F_{\boldsymbol{S}_{n+1}}(t) = \frac{(\alpha t)^n}{n!} \ e^{-\alpha t} \ ,$$

which means that $\boldsymbol{N}(t)$ has a Poisson distribution with expectation αt.

[1] It is a double hash SHA256(SHA256(header)), a nonce and an extra-nonce are used.

3. Mining race.

We consider the situation described in section 11 of [7] (p.9) where a group of attacker miners attempts a double spend attack. The attacker group has a fraction $0 < q < 1/2$ of the total hash rate, and the rest, the honest miners, has a fraction $p = 1 - q$. Thus the probability that the attackers find the next block is q while the probability for the honest miners is p. Nakamoto computes the probability for the attackers to catch up when z blocks have been mined by the honest group. In general to replace the chain mined by the honest miners and succeed a double spend the attackers need to mine $z + 1$ blocks, i.e. to mine a longer chain. In the analysis it is assumed that we are not near an update of the difficulty which remains constant [2].

The first discussion in section 11 of [7] is about computing the probability q_z of the attacker catching up when they lag by z blocks behind the honest miners. The analysis is correct and is similar to the Gamblers Ruin problem. We review it.

Lemma 3.1. *Let q_n be the probability of the event E_n, "catching up from n blocks behind". We have*

$$q_n = (q/p)^n \ .$$

Proof. We have $q_0 = 1$, $q_1 = q/p$, and by the Markov property

$$q_{n+m} = \mathbb{P}[E_{n+m}] = \mathbb{P}[E_n|E_m].\mathbb{P}[E_m] = \mathbb{P}[E_n].\mathbb{P}[E_m] = q_n.q_m \ ,$$

thus $q_n = q_1^n$ and the result follows.

□

Note that after one more block has been mined, we have for $n \geq 1$,

$$q_n = q q_{n-1} + p q_{n+1} \ ,$$

and the only solution to this recurrence with $q_0 = 1$ and $q_n \to 0$ is $q_n = (q/p)^n$.

We consider the random variables $\boldsymbol{T}$ and $\boldsymbol{S}_n$, resp. $\boldsymbol{T}'$ and $\boldsymbol{S}'_n$, associated to the group of honest, resp. attacker, miners. And also consider the random Poisson process $\boldsymbol{N}(t)$, resp. $\boldsymbol{N}'(t)$. The random variables $\boldsymbol{T}$ and $\boldsymbol{T}'$ are clearly independent and have exponential distributions with parameters α and α'. We have

$$\mathbb{P}[\boldsymbol{T}' < \boldsymbol{T}] = \frac{\alpha'}{\alpha + \alpha'} \ ,$$

[2] The difficulty is adjusted every 2016 blocks.

so

$$
\begin{aligned}
p &= \frac{\alpha}{\alpha+\alpha'} \ , \\
q &= \frac{\alpha'}{\alpha+\alpha'} \ .
\end{aligned}
$$

Moreover, $\inf(\boldsymbol{T}, \boldsymbol{T}')$ is an exponentially distributed random variable with parameters $\alpha+\alpha'$ which represents the mining speed of the entire network, honest and attacker miners together. The Bitcoin protocol is calibrated such that $\alpha+\alpha' = \tau_0$ with $\tau_0 = 10\,\mathrm{min}$. So we have

$$
\begin{aligned}
\mathbb{E}[\boldsymbol{T}] &= \frac{1}{\alpha} = \frac{\tau_0}{p} \ , \\
\mathbb{E}[\boldsymbol{T}'] &= \frac{1}{\alpha'} = \frac{\tau_0}{q} \ .
\end{aligned}
$$

These results can also be obtained in the following way. The hash function used in bitcoin block validation is $h(x) = \mathrm{SHA256}(\mathrm{SHA256}(x))$. The hashrate is the number of hashes per second performed by the miners. At a stable hashrate regime, the average time it takes to validate a block by the network is $\tau_0 = 10$ min. If the difficulty is set to be $d \in (0, 2^{256}-1]$, we validate a block when $h(BH) < d$, where BH is the block header. The pseudo-random output of SHA256 shows that we need to compute an average number of $m = 2^{256}/d$ hashes to find a solution. Let h, resp. h', be the hashrates of the honest miners, resp. the attackers. The total hashrate of the network is $h+h'$, and we have

$$
\begin{aligned}
p &= \frac{h}{h+h'} \ , \\
q &= \frac{h'}{h+h'} \ .
\end{aligned}
$$

Let t_0, resp. t_0', be the average time it takes to validate a block by the honest miners, resp. the attackers. We have

$$
\begin{aligned}
(h+h')\,\tau_0 &= m \ , \\
h\,t_0 &= m \ , \\
h'\,t_0' &= m \ ,
\end{aligned}
$$

and from this we get that τ_0 is half the harmonic mean of t_0 and t_0',

$$
\tau_0 = \frac{t_0 t_0'}{t_0 + t_0'} \ ,
$$

and also

$$p = \frac{t_0'}{t_0 + t_0'} = \frac{\tau_0}{t_0} \ ,$$
$$q = \frac{t_0}{t_0 + t_0'} = \frac{\tau_0}{t_0'} \ .$$

Going back to the Poisson distribution parameters, we have

$$\alpha = \frac{1}{t_0} = \frac{p}{\tau_0} \ ,$$
$$\alpha' = \frac{1}{t_0'} = \frac{q}{\tau_0} \ ,$$

and we recover the relations

$$p = \frac{\alpha}{\alpha + \alpha'} \ ,$$
$$q = \frac{\alpha'}{\alpha + \alpha'} \ .$$

4. Nakamoto's analysis.

Once the honest miners mine the z-th block, the attackers have mined k blocks with a probability computed in the next section (Proposition 5.1). If $k > z$, then the attackers chain is adopted and the attack succeeds. Otherwise the probability they catch up is $(q/p)^z$ as computed above, therefore the probability P of success of the attack is

$$P = \mathbb{P}[\boldsymbol{N}'(\boldsymbol{S}_z) \geq z] + \sum_{k=0}^{z-1} \mathbb{P}[\boldsymbol{N}'(\boldsymbol{S}_z) = k].q_{z-k} \ .$$

Then Nakamoto makes the simplifying assumption that the blocks have been mined according to average expected time per block. This is asymptotically true when $z \to +\infty$ but false otherwise. More precisely, he approximates $\boldsymbol{N}'(\boldsymbol{S}_z)$ by $\boldsymbol{N}'(t_z)$ where

$$t_z = \mathbb{E}[\boldsymbol{S}_z] = z\mathbb{E}[\boldsymbol{T}] = \frac{z\tau_0}{p} \ .$$

As we have seen above, the random variable $\boldsymbol{N}'(t_z)$ follows a Poisson distribution with parameter

$$\lambda = \alpha' t_z = \frac{z\alpha'\tau_0}{p} = \frac{zq}{p} \ .$$

The final calculus in [7] is then

$$\begin{aligned} P_{SN}(z) &= \mathbb{P}[\boldsymbol{N}'(t_z) \geq z] + \sum_{k=0}^{z-1} \mathbb{P}[\boldsymbol{N}'(t_z) = k].q_{z-k} \\ &= 1 - \sum_{k=0}^{z-1} \mathbb{P}[\boldsymbol{N}'(t_z) = k] + \sum_{k=0}^{z-1} \mathbb{P}[\boldsymbol{N}'(t_z) = k].q_{z-k} \\ &= 1 - \sum_{k=0}^{z-1} e^{-\lambda} \frac{\lambda^k}{k!} (1 - q_{z-k}) \ . \end{aligned}$$

However, this analysis is not correct since $\boldsymbol{N}'(\boldsymbol{S}_z) \neq \boldsymbol{N}'(t_z)$.

5. The correct analysis.

Let $\boldsymbol{X}_n = \boldsymbol{N}'(\boldsymbol{S}_n)$ be the number of blocks mined by the attackers when the honest miners have just mined the n-th block. We compute the distribution for $\boldsymbol{X}_n$.

Proposition 5.1. *The random variable $\boldsymbol{X}_n$ has a negative binomial distribution with parameters (n, p), i.e. for $k \geq 0$,*

$$\mathbb{P}[\boldsymbol{X}_n = k] = p^n q^k \binom{k+n-1}{k} \ .$$

Proof. Let $k \geq 0$. We have that $\boldsymbol{N}'$ and $\boldsymbol{S}_n$ are independent, therefore

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbb{P}[\boldsymbol{X}_n = k] &= \int_0^{+\infty} \mathbb{P}[\boldsymbol{N}'(\boldsymbol{S}_n) = k | \boldsymbol{S}_n \in [t, t+dt]] \cdot \mathbb{P}[\boldsymbol{S}_n \in [t, t+dt]] \\ &= \int_0^{+\infty} \mathbb{P}[\boldsymbol{N}'(t) = k] \cdot f_{\boldsymbol{S}_n}(t) dt \\ &= \int_0^{+\infty} \frac{(\alpha' t)^k}{k!} e^{-\alpha' t} \cdot \frac{\alpha^n}{(n-1)!} t^{n-1} e^{-\alpha t} dt \\ &= \frac{p^n q^k}{(n-1)! k!} \cdot \int_0^{+\infty} t^{k+n-1} e^{-t} dt \\ &= \frac{p^n q^k}{(n-1)! k!} \cdot (k+n-1)! \end{aligned}$$

□

Thus we confirm that the distribution of $\boldsymbol{X}_n$ is not a Poisson law with parameter nq/p as claimed by Nakamoto. Only asymptotically we have a convergence to the Poisson distribution: